Abstract. We consider the central cryptographic task of secure twoparty computation, where two parties wish to compute some function of their private inputs (each receiving possibly different outputs) and security should hold with respect to arbitrarily-malicious behavior of either of the participants. Despite extensive research in this area, the exact round-complexity of this fundamental problem (i.e., the number of rounds required to compute an arbitrary poly-time functionality) was not previously known.
Introduction
Round complexity is a central measure of efficiency for any interactive protocol, and much research has focused on improving bounds on the round complexity of various cryptographic tasks. As representative examples (this list is not exhaustive), we mention work on upper-and lower-bounds for zero-knowledge proofs and arguments [15, 25, 22, 23, 7] , concurrent zero-knowledge [37, 31, 11, 36] , and secure two-party and multi-party computation [38, 4, 6, 29, 33, 17, 12, 18, 30] . The study of secure two-party computation is fundamental in this regard: not only does it encompasses functionalities whose round-complexity is of independent interest (such as coin tossing or the zero-knowledge functionality), but it also serves as an important special case in the study of secure computation.
Yao [38] presented a constant-round protocol for secure two-party computation when the adversarial party is assumed to be honest-but-curious (or passive). Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [24, 20] extended Yao's result, and showed a protocol for secure multi-party computation (and two-party computation in particular) tolerating malicious (or active) adversaries. Unfortunately, their protocol does not run in a constant number of rounds. Recently, Lindell [33] gave the first constant-round protocol for secure two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries; he achieves this result by constructing the first constantround coin-tossing protocol (for polynomially-many coins) and then applying the techniques of [24] . The number of rounds in the resulting protocol for secure two-party computation is not specified by Lindell, but is on the order of 20-30.
The above works all focus on the case of a non-adaptive adversary. A general methodology for constructing protocols secure against an adaptive adversary is known [10] , and typically requires additional rounds of interaction.
Lower bounds on the round-complexity of secure two-party computation with respect to black-box 1 proofs of security have also been given. ( We comment further on black-box bounds in Section 1.2.) Goldreich and Krawczyk [23] showed that, assuming N P ⊆ BP P , zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs or arguments for N P require 4 rounds. Since ZK proofs (of knowledge) are a particular example of a two-party functionality, this establishes a lower bound of 4 rounds for secure two-party computation (see also the remark below). Under the same complexity assumption, Lindell [34] has shown that for some polynomial p, secure cointossing of p(k) coins requires at least 4 rounds.
Our Results
Here, we exactly characterize the (black-box) round complexity of secure twoparty computation by improving the known bounds. In particular:
Lower bound: We show that 5 rounds are necessary for securely tossing any super-logarithmic (in the security parameter) number of coins, with respect to black-box proofs of security. Thus implies a 5-round black-box lower bound for a number of other (deterministic) functionalities as well. Beyond the implications for the round complexity of secure computation, we believe the result is of independent interest due to the many applications of coin-tossing to other cryptographic tasks.
The result of Goldreich and Krawczyk [23] mentioned above implies a blackbox lower bound of five rounds for the "symmetric" ZK functionality (where the parties simultaneously prove statements to each other) -and hence the same lower bound on the black-box round complexity of secure two-party computation of general functionalities -assuming N P ⊆ BP P . In contrast, our lower bound holds unconditionally. Matching upper bound: As our main result, we construct 5-round protocols for securely computing any (randomized) poly-time functionality in the presence of a malicious adversary. Our protocols may be based on various cryptographic assumptions, including certified, enhanced trapdoor permutations (see Definition 1 and Remark 1), or homomorphic encryption schemes satisfying certain additional properties (a discussion of which we defer to the full version). The former may be based on, e.g., the RSA assumption for large public exponents, while the latter may be based on, e.g., the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in certain groups. Due to space limitations, in this abstract we focus on the (more difficult) case of certified trapdoor permutations, and refer the reader to the eventual full version for protocols based on alternate assumptions.
In Section 4.1, we sketch how our protocols can be extended -without increasing the round complexity and without requiring erasures -to tolerate an adaptive adversary who can corrupt at most one of the players. The necessary cryptographic assumptions are described in more detail there.
A Note on Black-Box Lower Bounds
Until the recent work of Barak [1, 2] , a black-box impossibility result was generally viewed as strong evidence for the "true" impossibility of a given task. Barak showed, however, that non-black-box use of an adversary's code could, in fact, be used to circumvent certain black-box impossibility results [1] . (The work of Hada and Tanaka [27] , while also showing a positive result using non-black-box techniques, relies on a non-standard cryptographic assumption.) Nevertheless, we believe there is still an important place in cryptography for black-box impossibility results for at least the following reasons:
1. A black-box impossibility result is useful insofar as it rules out a certain class of techniques for solving a given problem. Thus, the result may guide researchers toward the techniques necessary to derive a solution. 2. With respect to our current understanding, protocols constructed using nonblack-box techniques seem inherently less efficient than those constructed using black-box techniques. Thus, a black-box impossibility result may be said to rule out constructions likely to be practical.
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Still, it remains an interesting open question to beat the lower bound given in this paper using non-black-box techniques, or to prove that this is impossible.
Discussion
Yao's results [38] give a 4-round protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries, assuming the existence of enhanced [21, Sec. C.1] trapdoor permutations (an optimal 3-round protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries can be constructed based on the existence of homomorphic encryption schemes). Our lower bound shows that additional rounds are necessary to achieve security against the stronger class of malicious adversaries. Our upper bound, however, shows that (at least in the case of trapdoor permutations) a single additional round suffices. Our technique for achieving security against adaptive adversaries applies only to adversaries who corrupt at most one of the players. A nice open question is to construct a constant-round protocol tolerating an adaptive adversary who can potentially corrupt both players.
Definitions and Cryptographic Preliminaries
Due to space limitations, we omit the (completely standard) definitions of security for two-party computation used in this work, which follow [26, 35, 5, 9, 20] . However, we provide in Appendix A our definition of black-box simulation which is used to prove the lower bound of Section 3.
We assume the reader is familiar with the cryptographic tools we use; therefore, due to space limitations, we refer the reader elsewhere for definitions of non-interactive (perfectly binding) commitment schemes [19] , 3-round witnessindistinguishable (WI) proofs of knowledge [16, 19] , witness-extended emulation for proofs/arguments of knowledge [33] , and the Feige-Shamir 4-round ZK argument of knowledge [15, 14] . We note that all the above may be constructed based on the existence of certified, enhanced trapdoor permutations.
To establish notation, we provide here our working definitions of trapdoor permutations, hard-core bits, and Yao's garbled circuit technique. We also discuss equivocal commitment, and show a new construction of this primitive.
Trapdoor permutations. For the purposes of the present abstract, we use the following simplified definition of trapdoor permutations (but see Remark 1):
and Invert(td, ·) is its inverse. F is a trapdoor permutation family if the following is negligible in k for all poly-size circuit families {A i }:
We additionally assume that F satisfies (a weak variant of ) "certifiability": namely, given some α it is possible to decide in polynomial time whether Eval(α, ·) is a permutation over {0, 1} k .
For notational convenience, we let (α, td) be implicit and will simply let f(·) denote Eval(α, ·), and f −1 (·) denote Invert(td, ·) (where α, td are understood from the context). Of course, f −1 can only be efficiently evaluated if td is known. Hard-core bits. We assume the reader is familiar with the notion of hard-core bits for any trapdoor permutation family (see [19] ), and thus we merely describe the notation we use. Let H = {h k : {0, 1} k → {0, 1}} be a hard-core bit for some trapdoor permutation family F (we will let k be implicit, and set h = h k ); thus (informally), h(z) is "hard" to predict given f(z). We extend this notation to a vector of k hard-core bits in the following way:
Yao's "garbled circuit". Our secure computation protocol uses as a building block the "garbled circuit" technique of Yao [38] which enables constant-round secure computation for honest-but-curious adversaries. We abstract Yao's technique, and only consider those aspects of it which are necessary for our proof of security. In what follows, F is a description of a two-input/single-output circuit whose inputs and output have the same length k (yet the technique may be generalized for inputs and output of arbitrary polynomial lengths). Yao's results give ppt algorithms Yao 1 , Yao 2 for which:
-Yao 1 is a randomized algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 k , a circuit F , and a string y ∈ {0, 1} k . It outputs a "garbled circuit" circuit and input-wire labels
k . The "garbled circuit" may be viewed as representing the function F (·, y). -Yao 2 is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input 1 k , a "garbled circuit" circuit, and k values Z 1 , . . . , Z k ∈ {0, 1} k . It outputs either an invalid symbol ⊥, or a value v ∈ {0, 1} k .
(When k is clear from the context, we omit it.) We briefly describe how the above algorithms may be used for secure computation in the honest-but-curious setting. Let player 1 (resp., 2) hold input x (resp., y), and assume that player 1 is to obtain the output F (x, y). First, player 2 computes (circuit, {Z i,b }) ← Yao 1 (F, y) and sends circuit to player 1. Then, the two players engage in k instances of oblivious transfer: in the i th instance, player 1 enters with "input" x i , player 2 enters with "input" (Z i,0 , Z i,1 ), and player 1 obtains the "output"
A 3-round protocol for oblivious transfer (OT) based on trapdoor permutations may be constructed as follows (we remark that using number-theoretic assumptions, 2-round OT is possible): Let player 1 have input b and player 2 have input strings Z 0 , Z 1 ∈ {0, 1} k (the goal is for player 1 to obtain Z b ). Player 2 begins by generating trapdoor permutation (f, f −1 ) and sending f to player 1. Next, player 1 chooses random z 0 , z 1 ∈ {0, 1} k , sets z b = f k (z b ) and zb = z b , and sends z 0 , z 1 to player 2. Finally, player 2 computes W 0 = Z 0 ⊕ h(f −k (z 0 )), computes W 1 analogously, and sends W 0 , W 1 to player 1. Player 1 can then easily recover Z b . (A proof of security for essentially the above protocol appears in [20] .) Note that in the honest-but-curious setting it is secure to run polynomially-many executions of the above in parallel.
Putting everything together, we obtain the following 3-round protocol for secure computation of any single-output functionality in the honest-but-curious setting:
Round 1 Player 2 runs Yao 1 to generate (circuit, {Z i,b }). He then sends circuit and the f's for oblivious transfer. Round 2 Player 1 sends k pairs (z 0 , z 1 ). Round 3 Player 2 sends k pairs (W 0 , W 1 ). Output computation Player 1 can now recover the appropriate {Z i } and thus compute the output value v using Yao 2 , as discussed above.
Finally, any protocol for secure computation of single-output functionalities can be used for secure computation of two-output functionalities using only one additional round [20, Prop. 7.2.11]. Furthermore, any protocol for secure computation of deterministic functionalities may be used for secure computation of randomized ones (with the same round complexity) [20, Prop. 7.4.4] . With the above in mind, we describe the properties required of Yao 1 , Yao 2 . We first require correctness: for any F, y, any output (circuit, {Z i }) of Yao 1 (F, y), and any x we have F (x, y) = Yao 2 (circuit, Z 1,x1 , . . . , Z k,x k ). The algorithms also satisfy the following notion of security: there exists a simulator Yao-Sim which takes x, v as input, and which outputs circuit and a set of k input-wire labels {Z i }; furthermore, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable (by poly-size circuit families):
Algorithms (Yao 1 , Yao 2 ) satisfying the above definitions may be constructed assuming the existence of one-way functions.
Equivocal commitment. Although various notions of equivocal commitment have appeared previously, we present here a definition and construction specific to our application. Informally, an equivocal commitment scheme is an interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver which is computationally hiding and computationally binding in a real execution of the protocol. However, in a simulated execution of the protocol (where the simulator interacts with the receiver), the simulator is not bound to any particular value but can instead open the commitment to any desired value. Furthermore, for any (non-uniform) ppt receiver R and any string x, the view of R when the real sender commits/decommits to x is computationally indistinguishable from the view of R when the simulator "commits" in an equivocal way and later opens this commitment as x. We defer a formal definition, especially since one follows easily from the construction we now provide.
We construct an equivocal commitment scheme for a single bit in the following way: let Com be a non-interactive (perfectly binding) commitment scheme. To commit to a bit x, the sender chooses coins ω 1 , ω 2 and computes C = Equiv(x; ω 1 , ω 2 ) def = Com(x; ω 1 )||Com(x; ω 2 ). It sends C to the receiver and performs a zero-knowledge proof/argument that C was constructed correctly (i.e., that there exist x, ω 1 , ω 1 such that C = Equiv(x; ω 1 , ω 2 )). The receiver rejects in case the proof/argument fails. To decommit, the sender chooses a bit b at random and reveals x, ω b . Note that a simulator can "equivocate" the commitment by setting C = Com(x; ω 1 )||Com(x; ω 2 ) (where x is chosen at random in {0, 1}), simulating the zero-knowledge step, and then revealing ω 1 or ω 2 depending on x and the bit to be revealed. By committing bit-by-bit, the above extends easily to yield an equivocal commitment scheme for polynomial-length strings.
The Round Complexity of Coin Tossing
We show that any protocol for securely flipping a super-logarithmic number of coins (which is proven secure via black-box simulation) requires at least 5 rounds. (The reader is referred to Appendix A for a definition of black-box simulation.) More formally:
, where k is the security parameter. Then there does not exist a 4-round protocol for tossing p(k) coins which can be proven secure via black-box simulation.
The above theorem refers to the case where both parties are supposed to receive the resulting coin as output.
A formal proof of the above appears in the full version; due to lack of space we simply provide some intuition below. Before doing so, we note that the above theorem is "tight" in the following two regards: first, for any p(k) = O(log k), 3-round protocols (proven secure using black-box simulation) for tossing p(k) coins are known [8, 24, 20] , assuming the existence of a non-interactive commitment scheme. Furthermore, our results of Section 4 imply a 5-round protocol (based on the existence of trapdoor permutations) for tossing any polynomial number of coins. In fact, we can also construct a 5-round protocol for tossing any polynomial number of coins based on the existence of a non-interactive commitment scheme; details will appear in the final version.
As intuition for the proof of Theorem 1, assume (toward a contradiction) some 4-round protocol Π for tossing p = p(k) coins. Without loss of generality, we may assume that player 1 sends the final message of Π (since in the ideal model, only player 1 has the ability to abort the trusted party); hence, player 2 must send the first message of Π. Consider a real-model adversary A 1 , corrupting player 1, who acts as follows: Let Good ⊂ {0, 1} p(k) be some set of "small" but noticeable size, whose exact size we will fix later. A 1 runs protocol Π honestly until it receives the third message, and then computes the value c of the tossed coin. If c ∈ Good, then A 1 completes execution of the protocol honestly and outputs some function of its view; otherwise, A 1 aborts with output ⊥.
Black-box security of Π implies the existence of a black-box ideal-model adversary B 1 satisfying the following property (informally)
We next define a real-model adversary A 2 , corrupting player 2, acting as follows: A 2 incorporates the code of B 1 and -simulating the trusted party for B 1 -feeds B 1 a coin c randomly chosen from Good. By the above, B 1 can with overwhelming probability "force" an execution with A 1 in which A 1 sees a view consistent with some c ∈ Good. We show that we can use B 1 to "force" an execution with (the honest) A 1 in which A 1 outputs some c ∈ Good with sufficiently high probability. Of course, A 2 (and hence B 1 ) interacts with the honest A 1 , and not with adversarial A 1 ; thus, in particular, A 2 (and hence B 1 ) cannot rewind A 1 . However, since A 1 acts "essentially" like the honest A 1 (with the only difference being due to aborts), we can show that A 2 "forces" A 1 to output a coin c ∈ Good with at least some inverse polynomial probability 1/q(k), where q(k) relates to the number of queries B 1 makes to its oracle for A 1 .
Choosing Good such that |Good|/2 k ≤ 1/2q(k), we derive a contradiction: in any ideal-model execution, an honest player 1 outputs a coin in Good with probability at most 1/2q(k); in the real world, however, A 2 forces an honest A 1 to output a coin in Good with probability at least 1/q(k). This implies a simple, poly-time distinguisher with non-negligible advantage at least 1/2q(k). Remark 2. Theorem 1 immediately extends to rule out 4-round, black-box protocols for other functionalities (when both parties are supposed to receive output), and in particular some natural, deterministic ones. For example, the theorem implies that 4 rounds are not sufficient for computing the "xor" functionality (i.e., F (x, y) = x ⊕ y) on inputs of super-logarithmic length, since any such protocol could be used to toss a super-logarithmic number of coins (in the same number of rounds). This can be generalized in the obvious way.
A 5-Round Protocol for Secure Computation
Here, we prove the existence of a 5-round protocol for secure computation of general functionalities based on the existence of (certified) trapdoor permutations (see Definition 1 and Remark 1). To simplify matters, we describe a 4-round protocol for secure computation of deterministic functionalities in which only the first party receives output; this suffices for our main result since any such protocol can be used for secure computation of randomized functionalities in which both parties receive (possibly different) outputs, at the cost of one additional round [20, Propositions 7.2.11 and 7.4.4].
Before describing our protocol, we provide some intuition about the "highlevel" structure of our protocol and highlight some techniques developed in the course of its construction. We stress that our protocol does not merely involve "collapsing" rounds by running things in parallel -new techniques are needed to obtain a round-optimal protocol. At the core of our protocol is Yao's 3-round protocol tolerating honest-but-curious adversaries (it will be helpful in what follows to refer to the description of Yao's "basic" protocol in Section 2). The standard way of adding robustness against malicious adversaries (see [20] ) is to "compile" this protocol by having the parties (1) commit to their inputs; (2) run (modified) coin-tossing protocols, so each party ends up with a random tape and the other party receives a commitment to this tape; and (3) run the basic Yao protocol with ZK proofs/arguments of correct behavior (given the committed values of the input and random tape) at each round. We may immediately note this approach will not suffice to obtain a 4-round protocol, since a ZK proof/argument for the first round of Yao's protocol alone will already require 4 rounds. Instead, we briefly (and informally) summarize some of the techniques we use to achieve a 4-round protocol. In the following (but not in the more formal description that follows), we number the rounds from 0-3, where round 0 corresponds to an "initialization" round, and rounds 1-3 correspond to rounds 1-3 of Yao's basic protocol.
-We first observe that in Yao's protocol a malicious player 2 gains nothing by using a non-random tape and thus coin-tossing for this party is not needed. -It is essential, however, that player 1 is unable to choose his coins in round two. However, full-blown coin-tossing is unnecessary, and we instead use a 3-round sub-protocol which "forces" player 1 to use an appropriate set of coins.
(This sub-protocol is run in rounds 0-2.) This component and its analysis are based loosely on earlier work of Barak and Lindell [3] . -When compiling Yao's protocol, player 1 may send his round-two message before the proof of correctness for round one (being given by player 2) is complete (here, we use the fact that the trapdoor permutation family being used is "certifiable"). We thus construct our protocol so the proof of correctness for round one completes in round three. To obtain a proof of security, we require player 2 to delay revealing circuit until round three. Yet, a proof of security also requires player 2 to be committed to a circuit at the end of the round one. We resolve this dilemma by having player 2 commit to circuit in round one using an equivocal commitment scheme. -Finally, use a specific WI proof of knowledge (from [32] ; see also [14] ) with the property that the statement to be proved (and, by implication, a witness) need not be known until the last round of the protocol, yet soundness, completeness, and witness-indistinguishability still hold. (The proof of knowledge aspect must be dealt with more carefully; see Appendix B.) Furthermore, this proof system has the property that the first message from the prover is computed independently of the statement being proved (as well as its witness); we use this fact when constructing an adaptively-secure protocol in Section 4.1.
We also construct a novel 4-round ZK argument of knowledge with similar properties (see Appendix B), by modifying the Feige-Shamir ZK argument of knowledge [15] . Our new protocol may be of independent interest.
Let F = {F k } k∈ be a polynomial-size (deterministic) circuit family representing the functionality of interest, where F k takes two k-bit inputs and returns a k-bit output to player 1. (Clearly, the protocol extends for arbitrary input/output lengths. We have also mentioned earlier how the protocol may be extended for randomized, two-output functionalities.) When k is understood, we write
k represent the input of player 1, let y = y 1 · · · y k ∈ {0, 1} k represent the input of player 2, and let v = F (x, y). In the following, i always ranges from 1 to k, and b ranges from 0 to 1. Third round. Player 1 proceeds as follows:
1. If any of the {f i,b } are not valid 3 , player 1 aborts. Otherwise, player 1 will use k parallel invocations of oblivious transfer to obtain the input-wire labels corresponding to its input x. Formally, for each i player 1 prepares values (z i,0 , z i,1 ) in the following way:
-If x i = 0, choose random z i,0 ∈ {0, 1} k and set z i,0 = f k i,0 (z i,0 ). Also, set z i,1 = r i,1 ⊕ r i,1 (recall, r i,1 was committed to by player 1 in the first round, and r i,1 was obtained from player 2 in the second round).
, and set Fourth round. The second player proceeds as follows:
1. If either PoK 3 or FS 3 would cause rejection, player 2 aborts. Otherwise, player 2 completes the oblivious transfer in the standard way. Namely, for each z i,b sent in the previous round, player 2 computes z i,b
) and xor's the k resulting hard-core bits with the corresponding input-wire labels thusly:
2. Define statement 4 as follows:
Informally, this says that player 2 performed the oblivious transfer correctly. 3. Player 2 prepares the final messages (denoted FS 4 ) for the modified FeigeShamir protocol. The statement to be proved is: statement 2 ∧ statement 4 . 4. Finally, player 2 decommits Equiv as circuit (recall from Section 2 how decommitment is done for equivocal commitments). Sufficient assumptions. As noted in Section 2, every component of the above protocol may be based on the existence of a trapdoor permutation family (the certifiability property is only needed for the verification performed by player 1 at the beginning of the third round). Furthermore, as noted in Remark 1, although the description of the protocol (and its proof of security) use the definition of a trapdoor permutation family given by Definition 1, it is possible to adapt the protocol so that its security may be based on any family of (certified) enhanced trapdoor permutations, as per the definitions of [19, 21] . Theorem 2. Assuming the existence of a trapdoor permutation family, the above protocol Π securely computes functionality F .
Proof. We separately prove two lemmas dealing with possible malicious behavior of each of the parties; the theorem follows. We first consider the case when player 2 is malicious: Lemma 1. Let (A 1 , A 2 ) be a pair of (non-uniform) ppt machines in which A 1 is honest. There exist a pair of (non-uniform) expected polynomial-time machines
Proof (sketch). Clearly, we may take B 1 to be honest. We assume that A 2 is deterministic, and construct B 2 using black-box access to A 2 as follows:
1. B 2 runs a copy of A 2 internally, passing to it any auxiliary information z.
To emulate the first round of the protocol, B 2 acts exactly as an honest player 1, generates a first-round message, and passes this message to A 2 .
In return, B 2 receives a second-round message which includes, in particular, We may note the following differences between the ideal world and the real world: (1) in the second round, B 2 sets z i,b = r i,b ⊕ r i,b for all i, b, whereas an honest player 1 does this only for i, b such that x i = b; also (2) B 2 passes the input value y to the trusted party (and hence player 1 will receive the value F (x, y) from this party), whereas in the real world player 1 will compute an output value based on the circuit and other values it receives from A 2 in the fourth round. Nevertheless, we claim that Equation (1) holds based on (1) the hiding property of the commitment scheme used in the first round and (2) the argument of knowledge (and hence soundness) property of the modified FeigeShamir protocol (cf. Appendix B), as well as the correctness of the Yao "garbled circuit" construction. A complete proof appears in the full version.
Lemma 2. Let (A 1 , A 2 ) be a pair of (non-uniform) ppt machines in which A 2 is honest. There exist a pair of (non-uniform) expected polynomial-time machines
Proof (sketch). Clearly, we may take B 2 to be honest. We assume that A 1 is deterministic, and construct B 1 using black-box access to A 1 as follows:
1. B 1 runs a copy of A 1 internally, passing to it any auxiliary information z and receiving a first-round message from A 1 . corresponding to (half) the commitments {Com i,b } sent by A 1 in the first round. If extraction fails, B 1 outputs fail. Otherwise, let b i ∈ {0, 1} be such that Com i,bi = Com(r i ; ω i ). B 1 then defines a string x = x 1 · · · x k as follows:
(x i is B 1 's "guess" as to which input-wire label A 1 is "interested in".) B 1 sends the string x thus defined to the trusted party, and receives a value v in return. It then runs Yao-Sim(x, v) to generate a garbled circuit circuit along with input-wire labels {Z i } (cf. Section 2). B 1 then prepares the "answers" {W i,b } to the oblivious transfer as follows, for each i: it correctly sets
emulates the fourth round of the protocol as follows: it sends the {W i,b } as computed above, sends circuit as computed above (note that the corresponding decommitment can be given since Equiv was constructed in an "equivocal" way), and uses the simulator for the modified Feige-Shamir protocol to compute FS 4 (cf. Appendix B). B 1 passes the final message thus constructed to A 1 , and outputs whatever A 1 outputs.
We note (informally) the following differences between the ideal world and the real world: (1) {Com i,b } are commitments to 0 k rather than to "real" input-wire labels; (2) Equiv is set up so that B 1 can "equivocate" and later open this as any value it chooses; (3) the modified Feige-Shamir ZK argument is simulated rather than real; (4) the answers {W i,xi } are "garbage" (where x is B 1 's guess as to the "input" of A 1 ); and (5) the garbled circuit is constructed using Yao-Sim rather than Yao 1 . Nevertheless, we claim that Equation (2) holds. Due to lack of space, a complete proof appears in the full version.
Handling Adaptive Adversaries
We briefly sketch how the protocol above can be modified -without increasing the round complexity -to provide security against an adaptive adversary who can monitor communication between the parties and decide whom to corrupt at any point during the protocol based on this information. (We consider only an adversary who can corrupt at most one of the parties.) In brief, we modify the protocol by using a (public-key) adaptively-secure encryption scheme [10] to encrypt the communication between the two parties. Two issues arise:
1. The encryption scheme of [10] requires a key-generation phase which would necessitate additional rounds. We avoid this extra phase using the assumption of simulatable public-key cryptosystems [13] (see below). The existence of such cryptosystems is implied in particular by the DDH assumption [13] ; see there for constructions based on alternate assumptions. 2. Regardless of the encryption scheme used, one additional round seems necessary just to exchange public keys. To avoid this, we do not encrypt the first message from player 1 to player 2. Nevertheless, the modified protocol is adaptively-secure: the proof uses the fact that the first round (as well as the internal state after the first round) is identical in both the real execution and the simulation for a malicious player 2 (cf. the proof of Lemma 1).
The modified protocol. Before describing our construction of an adaptivelysecure encryption scheme, we outline how it will be used to achieve adaptive security for our protocol. Let Π denote the protocol given in the previous section. Our adaptively-secure protocol Π proceeds as follows: in the first round of Π , player 1 sends a message just as in the first round of Π, but also sends sufficiently-many public keys (for an adaptively-secure encryption scheme) to enable player 2 to encrypt the messages of rounds two and four. (The adaptivelysecure encryption scheme we use only allows encryption of a single bit; therefore, the number of public keys sent by player 1 is equal to the bit-length of messages two and four in Π.) In the second round of Π , player 2 constructs a message as in Π, encrypts this message using the corresponding public keys sent in round one, and additionally sends sufficiently-many public keys (for an adaptively-secure encryption scheme) to enable player 1 to encrypt the messages of rounds three and five. Π proceeds by having the players construct a message just as in the corresponding round of Π and then having them encrypt these messages using the appropriate public keys sent by the other player. We defer a proof of security for this construction to the final version.
An adaptively-secure encryption scheme. Informally, a public-key cryptosystem for single-bit plaintexts is simulatable if (1) it is possible to obliviously generate a public key without learning the corresponding secret key, and also (2) given a public key, it is possible to obliviously sample a random (valid) ciphertext without learning the corresponding message. We assume further that if a ciphertext is obliviously sampled in this way, then the probability that the corresponding plaintext will be a 0 or 1 is equal (or statistically close). See [13, Def. 2] for a formal definition. Given such a cryptosystem, our construction of an adaptively-secure encryption scheme for a single-bit is as follows: the receiver generates k pairs (pk i,0 , pk i,1 ) of public keys by generating one key of each pair (selected at random) using the key-generation algorithm, and the other key using the oblivious sampling algorithm. This also results in a set of k secret keys (one for each pair of public keys). To encrypt a bit m, the sender proceeds as follows: for each index i, choose a random bit b i , set C bi ← E pk i,b i (m) and choose Cb i using the oblivious sampling algorithm. Then send the k ciphertext pairs (C 0 , C 1 ).
To decrypt, the receiver decrypts one ciphertext out of each pair using the secret key it knows, and sets the decrypted message equal to the majority of the recovered bits. Note that correctness holds with all but negligible probability since (on average) 3/4 of the 2k ciphertexts constructed by the sender decrypt to the desired message m (namely, the k ciphertexts encrypted using the legitimate encryption algorithm, along with (on average) 1/2 of the remaining k ciphertexts chosen via the oblivious sampling algorithm).
We defer a proof that this scheme is adaptively secure to the full version.
